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A number of recent writers have argued that the obligations of modern states to
people who will exist in the future may far outstrip their obligations to their present
citizens, given the vast number of people who will exist in the future and whose
livelihoods depend on our actions (Beckstead 2013, Greaves and MacAskill 2019, John
2020, Tarsney 2019). And yet modern states do precious little on behalf of future
generations, choosing to allow and incentivize destructive practices such as the
widespread burning of fossil fuels, while failing to take preventative measures that could
deter global pandemics and other catastrophes.
The state is plagued with problems of political short-termism: the excessive
priority given to near-term benefits at the cost of future ones (González-Ricoy and
Gosseries 2016B). By the accounts of many political scientists and economists, political
leaders rarely look beyond the next 2-5 years and into the problems of the next decade.
There are many reasons for this, from time preference (Frederick et al 2002, Jacobs and
Matthews 2012) to cognitive bias (Caney 2016, Johnson and Levin 2009, Weber 2006) to
perverse re-election incentives (Arnold 1990, Binder 2006, Mayhew 1974, Tufte 1978),2
but all involve foregoing costly action in the short term (e.g. increasing taxes, cutting
benefits, imposing regulatory burdens) that would have larger moderate- to long-run
2For a contrary view, see (Beck 1982).
1This paper was greatly improved by feedback from Greg Bognar, Axel Gosseries, and Adam Gibbons.
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benefits.3 Such behavior fails not only the generations of people who are to come, but
also the large number of existing citizens who still have much of their lives left to lead.
One type of mechanism for ameliorating political short-termism that receives
much attention these days involves apportioning greater relative political influence to the
young. As the story goes: younger citizens generally have greater additional life
expectancy than older citizens, and it therefore looks reasonable to expect that they have
preferences that are extended further into the future. If we apportion greater relative
political influence to the young, it therefore seems that our political system as a whole
will show greater concern for the future.
In light of this story, a number of particular mechanisms have been proposed for
apportioning greater relative political influence to the young, including lowering the
voting age (Piper 2020), weighting votes inversely with age (MacAskill 2019, Parijs 1998),
disenfranchising the elderly (Parijs 1998), and instituting youth quotas in legislatures
(Bidadanure 2016, MacKenzie 2016).4
In what follows, I argue that merely apportioning greater political power to the
young is unlikely to make states significantly less short-termist, but underexplored
age-based mechanisms may be more successful. In particular, states might mitigate
short-termism by employing age-based surrogacy and liability incentives mechanisms
within a deliberative body of young people charged with representing the young.
In Section I, I state precisely the argument for apportioning greater political power
4 Bidadanure (2016) does not accept this story, and justifies youth quotas on other grounds.
3 For a general overview of the causes of short-termism and some mechanisms for ameliorating it, see recent work
from Caney (2016), John and MacAskill (2021), and González-Ricoy and Gosseries (2016C).
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to the young on grounds of combating political short-termism. In Section II, I argue that
the extant empirical literature on the relationship between ageing and short-termist
policy support suggests that there is little relationship between the two, and so the
argument for apportioning greater political power to the young fails. In Section III, I
identify age-based strategies which are better supported by existing political science
research, and advocate combining these strategies in a novel youth assembly.
I. Youth Empowerment, Efficiency, and Justice
According to a common view, a political system which is influenced by the elderly
will tend to have a more short-term focus than a political system which evades or
counteracts such influence (Parijs 1998). This is because the young can generally expect to
live for a much longer period of time than the elderly, and, so the argument goes, they
will therefore generally have preferences that extend much further into the future.
Younger people tend to have more remaining years of well-being, younger friends and
families, and more personal goals in the years ahead of them. Thus, we may reasonably
expect that younger people will be more concerned that the future goes well over longer
time horizons. On the assumption that voters, policymakers, and other political actors are
at least somewhat rational in acting on their preferences, we could then infer that
younger political actors will tend to support policies with a more long-term focus than
older political actors. Thus, we should expect to find that political systems in which older
age groups have more political influence are more short-termist.
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This common view provides the starting point for a powerful argument for
increasing the influence of the young on politics. Short-termism has extremely deleterious
effects on political decision-making, and so any even modest amelioration of political
short-termism is a morally urgent priority. While it is somewhat difficult to measure
precisely the harms of excessively prioritising the near term, they appear to be substantial
in aggregate. Hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars are spent annually on global disaster
relief despite studies finding regularly that investment in disaster preparation provides
between 6 and 15 times as much benefit as the same size investment in disaster relief
(Healy and Malhotra 2009, Mutihazard Mitigation Council 2017). The UN Office of
Disaster Risk Reduction reports further that “an investment of $6 billion annually in
disaster risk management would result in avoided losses of $360 billion over the next 15
years.” The U.S. healthcare system wastes between $88.6 billion and $111.1 billion each
year by failing to adopt sufficient preventive care measures and instead adopting
excessively reactive medical practices (Shrank et al 2019). Net mitigation costs of global
climate change, estimated at several hundred billion USD per year, increase, on average,
by approximately 40 percent for each decade of delay (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers
2014). The failure of governments to adequately prepare for COVID-19—including by
failing to accurately forecast its reproduction rate in 2020 and by failing to make sufficient
investments in pandemic preparedness in years past—is estimated to cost the United
States over $1 trillion per month along with millions of lives globally (Makridis and Hartley
2020). Certainly, failure to prevent future, more serious global catastrophes such as
biological terrorism and nuclear war could cost us much more (Ord 2020).
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Short-termism has numerous causes, and is exacerbated by global coordination
problems and more. So no simple institutional fix will resolve all of these problems. And
attending to short-term costs is clearly important. Global GDP trends indicate that our
descendents will be wealthier than us, which may justify our borrowing some resources
from the future to address near-term problems. Yet the available indicators tell us that
short-termism costs the global economy many billions and perhaps trillions of dollars
annually, and leads directly to millions of deaths from disasters and suboptimal spending.
The exchange rate at which we are borrowing from our descendents and from our future
selves clearly cannot be sustained. If we can identify institutional repairs to some of
short-termism’s sources, we should doubtlessly pursue them.
The Challenge of Legitimacy
The common view implies that it is both possible and desirable to ameliorate
short-termism by distributing greater political power to the young. This idea is based on
utilitarian efficiency: all else equal, we should not choose smaller welfare benefits for
humankind over larger benefits. But this is arguably not the only moral consideration
relevant to assessing such proposals.
Many strategies for increasing the formal political power of the young entail the
provision of unequal formal political power to members of the demos, and unequal
opportunities for influence. There is a sense in which giving the young disproportionate
formal political power amounts to giving them power over the elderly, raising questions of
political legitimacy: there are weighty moral reasons against giving greater formal political
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power to some citizens than to others.
There are, however, at least three reasons why such legitimacy concerns are not
sufficient grounds for dismissing proposals such as age-weighted voting which give
greater formal political power to the young.5 First, in a society where the elderly control a
great deal of informal political power (such as social and economic influence), providing
greater formal political power (such as votes) to the young may in fact lead to an increase
in the equality of the political system overall, making it more egalitarian than a system
where all members of the demos have equal formal political power.
Second, apportioning formal political power based on age is consistent with
treating people equally across their whole lives. If younger people are apportioned
greater voting power, this is a privilege allocated to everyone who will ever live in that
political system, during the period in which they are young (MacAskill 2019). Total formal
political power across people’s lives remains equal among the demos.
Third, inequalities in power must be rectified not only within a generation, but
also between generations. The current generation wields immense power over future
generations: they are subjected to our laws and the causal fallout of all of our decisions. A
political system that allows unequal power relationships between some of its present
members in order to give a greater say (by proxy) to future generations over the laws by
which they are governed may therefore be a more legitimate system than one that
ensures equal power relationships between its present members and leaves future
generations disempowered (González-Ricoy and Gosseries 2016A, Gosseries 2016, John
5For a contrary view, see Karnein and Roser, 2015.
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2020).6
So we have what appears to be a promising argument for apportioning greater
political power to the young, such as by weighting votes with age or instituting legislative
youth quotas. Intuitively, people are likely to have more near-term-oriented preferences
as they age, and will therefore generally support more short-termist policy. Redistributing
political power to younger citizens is therefore likely to make political systems less
short-termist. Given that short-termism causes immense harms both fiscal and material,
this would have extremely good results, and considerations of legitimacy do not clearly
prohibit us from redistributing political power in this way.
II. Why this Case for Youth Empowerment Fails on Current Evidence
Surprisingly, when we look at the empirical literature on short-termism and ageing
we do not find confirmation for this intuitively plausible hypothesis. It turns out that the
common view is flawed in its core assumption: the empirical literature does not show any
systematic correlations between ageing and shorter time-horizons.
Subjective Discount Rate
The standard method of measuring intertemporal tradeoffs or “time preference”
is the Subjective Discount Rate (SDR). The SDR measures the extent to which people
6A fourth consideration is this: political legitimacy is fungible with other values. It is widely accepted that we may
sometimes use undemocratic procedures to avoid costly errors (Halstead 2016). For example, most constitutions
rightly protect people’s fundamental rights from overrule by the majority. It is sometimes morally laudable to
accept costs to the democratic equality of a decision procedure to achieve large welfare and other benefits, if this
is the best way to achieve those benefits.
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discount the value of goods the longer they must wait to receive those goods. Studies of
SDR typically offer participants a series of choices between receiving some amount of
good (such as money) or burden (such as required effort) at a time in the near future or a
larger amount of that good or burden in the more distant future. After several choices,
researchers can derive a discount function which maps participant willingness to discount
goods across varying periods of time.
The argument for increasing the political power of the young assumes that
younger people will tend to have a lower SDR. This is because it starts from the idea that
older people, given their smaller remaining lifespan, are less interested in receiving goods
in the future (given the risk of dying beforehand) and more interested in pushing burdens
into the future than younger people. Some work in economic theory predicts that the
SDR will be a bit more complicated than this. The SDR might be a U-shaped function: the
youngest people have a high discount rate because they lack self-control, their SDR
decreases throughout life as they gain self-control and have children whose futures they
must care about, and people’s SDR then increases towards the end of life when they have
fewer remaining life-years (Chao et al 2009, Chu et al 2008, Read and Read 2004). If this
picture were accurate, we might instead empower the middle-aged rather than the young
to secure intergenerational justice.
Surprisingly, extant empirical research on ageing confirms neither the hypothesis
that SDR increases monotonically with age nor that SDR is a U-shaped function of age.
Instead, we find an assortment of mixed results. Several studies have indeed found that
SDR increases with age (Green et al 1994, Liu et al 2016, Read and Read 2004, Seamen et
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al 2016, Vanderveldt 2016), although studies are equally likely to find that SDR decreases
with age (Bixter and Rogers 2019, Eppinger 2012, Halfmann et al 2013, Harrison et al
2002, Löckenhoff 2011, Trostel and Taylor 2007) or that there is no relationship between
the two (Chao et al 2009, Rieger and Mata 2013, Roalf et al 2011). This variability persists
if we exclude studies with small sample sizes (N < 268) or reduce cultural variation by
including only studies with sample populations in the United States. Only one study has
found an SDR that is a U-shaped function of age (Read and Read 2004), and only one
study has found an SDR that is a U-shaped function of health and survival expectations
(Chao et al 2009). Several other studies contradict these results (Green et al 1994,
Harrison et al 2002, Liu et al 2016, Löckenhoff 2011, Rieger and Mata 2013, Seamen et al
2016, Trostel and Taylor 2007).
A limitation of these studies is that many elicit discount rates over timescales
shorter than a year, significantly reducing the hypothesized effect of a shorter life
expectancy on one’s SDR. But even in the three studies with a time horizon of at least ten
years we find no univocal takeaway (Green et al 1994, Read and Read 2004, Vanderveldt
2016).
The best explanation for this variability appears to be that SDR is a highly
multifaceted phenomenon that is mediated by numerous factors other than age including
wealth, retirement, and political ideology, and which varies in direction and magnitude
from one decision context to another. We therefore need more nuanced research on SDR
to isolate and measure the various psychological processes and determinants which
underlie its complex structure. This explanation is supported by a 2002 review of three
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decades of literature on intertemporal choice, which finds subjective discount rates
ranging from negative integers to infinity (Frederick et al 2002). The study concludes that
there is no empirical support for the idea that intertemporal choice should be modeled
with a single discount rate that is consistent across choice situations.
The argument from smaller additional life expectancy to higher discount rate
appears to have assumed too naïve a picture of decision psychology. We need a better
way to find out what if any relationship holds between age and short-term policy
preference.7
Values
The most direct way to assess the relationship between age and short-term policy
preference is to look at the policy preferences that people actually have, expressed in
voting. The common view described in Section I implies that younger people will tend to
have less short-termist policy preferences. Once again, the empirical literature presents us
with mixed findings. The effect of age on short-term policy preference appears to be
minimal or non-existent. Cohort effects, social cohesion between voters and other
groups, ideological identity, and policy uncertainty appear to be much bigger drivers of
short-termism in voter behavior. As such, simply apportioning greater political power to
the young will do little to reduce political short-termism.
7An additional obstacle for the move from intertemporal trade-offs in personal losses and gains to voting behavior
is the vote-buy gap (Norwood et al 2019, Paul et al 2019). Across a range of policy areas such as green energy,
for-profit prisons, and caged eggs, citizens regularly take political action that is in apparent conflict with their
consumer behavior: raising their taxes to fund green energy while failing to source their own electricity from
windmills, banning prison practices which they support with their banking, and even banning products which they
regularly consume. It appears that looking at people’s personal consumer and financial habits is a bad way to
predict the policies they will support.
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Two recent studies of 305 Swiss and 82 international referenda offer strong prima
facie support to the idea that age is correlated with preferences for more short-termist
policy. These studies, conducted by Gabriel Ahlfeldt and colleagues, categorize the
answers to referenda questions according to the generational interests that they most
promote (young vs elderly), analyzing the extent to which younger and older voters
support referenda decisions that are in their generational self-interest, and come away
with the strong conclusion that referenda “voters make deliberate choices that maximize
their expected utility conditional on their stage in the lifecycle” (Ahlfeldt et al 2016,
2018). They find that younger voters “tend to be less conservative, attach higher priorities
to the protection of the environment, and are more supportive of policies that, in relative
terms, benefit the young.” In the Swiss study these values are shown to swing free from
cohort effects, as well as the effects of status quo habituation.
If the findings of Ahlfeldt and colleagues are accurate and generalizable to most
countries and times, then they provide some support for the idea that older voters in fact
support more short-termist policies. However, their findings are of limited significance. A
key limitation is that many of the policy areas in which Ahlfeldt et al find generational
conflict are areas of intratemporal generational conflict rather than intertemporal
generational conflict. For decisions about issues such as end of life care, school spending,
sports facilities, retirement, unemployment, and transportation—the majority of the
referenda studied—generational differences in attitudes likely correspond to people’s
different preferences in their current stage of life rather than their different preferences
over longer timescales. Finding that working people want better unemployment benefits
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does not indicate that they have longer time horizons in view but rather that they are at
greater present risk of unemployment.
The studies’ findings of significance for our purposes, then, are exclusively the
effects of age on environmental and energy policy. In the international study, Ahlfeldt et
al (2016) find that age is not an unambiguous determinant of voting decisions on
environmental legislation.8 In the Swiss study, which is much larger and better-controlled,
Ahlfeldt et al find that age is a significant determinant of pro-environmentalist attitudes,
to the point that a 20-year-old voter is 10% more likely to vote favorably to the
environment than an 80-year-old voter (Ahlfeldt et al 2018: 16).
The other major study on the effects of ageing on support for more short-termist
policy comes from Alan Jacobs and J. Scott Matthews, who survey 1,213 voting-age
American citizens about their preferences on hypothetical U.S. Social Security policy
(Jacobs & Matthews 2012). The study asks participants to vote on a Social Security reform
proposal that would impose taxes and benefit cuts for the next 5 or 40 years in order to
prevent taxes and benefit cuts that were much larger when the period had ended. Jacobs
and Matthews introduce two experimental manipulations, varying both the timing of the
policy benefits and the causal complexity of the reform. Strikingly, Jacobs and Matthews
find that time preference is not a major driver of short-termism in policy preferences.
Measurements of participants’ subjective discount rate in fact inversely correlated with
participants’ willingness to forego more distant future benefits. Importantly, Jacobs and
Matthews find no discernible effect of age on participant decisions about long-term policy
8Findings on the relationship between age and support for green energy in this study are omitted because the
particular referenda analyzed are also included in the 2018 study.
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investment. Instead, they find that the primary drivers of short-term political
decision-making are uncertainty about whether policies will in fact have their intended
long-run effects, and about whether future political leaders will act on the commitments
we make today rather than reneging.
Implications
The existing data on the relationship between age and short-termist political
decision-making is ambiguous. No stable relationship has been found between age and
SDR, and the direct effect of age on short-termism appears relatively small (10% less likely
to support green policy over the lifespan) or non-existent.
Empowering the young by merely allocating them more formal political power
may yet help combat political short-termism. In some countries and times, a small
percent increase in green policy support may be enough to shift energy policy. Depending
on cohort effects, some groups of young people may be especially oriented towards the
long term, making the contingent effect of proposals to empower the young much
stronger. But given that young people’s voting behavior does not appear to be
significantly less short-termist than that of older people, simply giving young people
additional votes is not a robust way to ameliorate political short-termism.
III. A Forward-looking Assembly
On present evidence we have little reason to believe that the young will use
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additional votes or legislative seats in a more prudent way than the elderly. But in this
section I argue that there are novel and powerful ways to harness young people’s greater
remaining life expectancy for the advantage of future generations which do not rely on
younger people having less short-termist policy preferences. The basic proposal is to
create a novel youth assembly—a permanent, soft-power institution whose members are
randomly selected from among the young—which rewards assembly members for
successful policy-making 30 years in the future, based on its later effects. Youth, here, is
centrally being exploited to extend the time horizon over which assembly members can
expect to reap future rewards.
Futures Assemblies
“Citizens assemblies” have been employed for consultation and
information-gathering purposes throughout the world. These randomly selected groups
of citizens provide deliberative and non-binding advice to the government in consultation
with recognized experts. One of the most high-profile initiatives was Ireland’s
100-member Citizens’ Assembly, which was established in 2016 and tasked with
considering questions related to abortion, fixed term parliaments, referenda, population
ageing, climate change, and gender equality. The deliberations of the Irish assembly
provoked a referendum to remove Ireland’s constitutional ban on abortion and
subtantially shaped Ireland’s Climate Action Plan (Coleman et al 2019).
The success of the Irish assembly and of citizens’ assemblies around the world
reveals the promise of citizens assemblies tasked with the explicit mandate to represent
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future generations, or “futures assemblies,” for ameliorating short-termism. A general
futures assembly, constituted by a stratified random sample of the general population,
would have numerous features that predict success at combating short-termism (John
and MacAskill 2021). Being an unelected and publicly-funded body, a futures assembly
would be insulated from perverse election and fundraising incentives that pressure
elected officials to focus on near-term, visible issues that can help them gain re-election.
Being randomly selected, it would be statistically representative of the general
population, and not chosen or excessively influenced by elected officials. And citizens’
assemblies have a demonstrated aptitude in “laboratory” and real-world experiments for
reducing the deleterious effects of partisanship on careful, long-term deliberation (Fishkin
and Luskin 2005, Fishkin et al 2017, List et al 2013). In the most recent major assembly,
the Climate Assembly UK, 98% of assembly members claimed to have understood almost
everything that those in their deliberation groups had said, and 94% felt respected by
their fellow participants under disagreement (with none feeling disrespected) (Climate
Assembly UK 2020). Finally, citizens’ assemblies are more informed than ordinary voters
due to their deliberations with experts, reducing the deleterious effect of policy
uncertainty on short-term policy support as found by Jacobs and Matthews’ Social
Security reform experiment.
Most importantly, a general futures assembly may need no incentive to reflect
carefully on the interests of future generations beyond an explicit mandate to do so.
Some limited evidence from the Kochi University Research Institute for Future Design
suggests that when parents are explicitly asked to cast votes on behalf of their children
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they vote for different parties than they normally would vote for in a sizable minority of
cases (Aoki and Vaithianathan 2012). This is a promising sign that those who are asked
explicitly to represent the younger generation do not simply use this opportunity to
promote their own agenda, but rather aim to promote the interests of the young, and
thereby adopt longer time horizons for political decision-making. This is further supported
by evidence that actors within institutions tend to be compelled to follow norms and
perform roles that are consistent with the established culture of their institution (Goodin
1986, MacKenzie 2016, Steiner et al 2005: 127). Put simply, people who are asked
explicitly to vote on behalf of another group seem to do so.
So a general futures assembly, tasked with representing future generations and
giving non-binding advice to the government, would likely do well at ameliorating political
short-termism. But it is possible to improve upon the assembly in two ways: first, by
better aligning the incentives of the deliberating body with the interests of future
generations, and second, by making its non-binding advice more difficult for the
government to ignore.
Mechanism Design
An explicit mandate may be sufficient to motivate futures assembly members to
adequately consider future generations in their recommendations. But there remain concerns
of value drift, irrational time discounting, and capture by political elites and industry. One
promising and underexplored mechanism for aligning incentives with the interests of future
generations involves retrospective accountability. The most central problem of representing the
16
interests of future generations in government is that of making political actors accountable to
future generations. Future generations cannot vote in our elections, nor can they sanction or
protest the decisions of their forebears. Retrospective accountability solves the accountability
problem by rewarding policy-makers many years into the future in proportion to the effects of
their policy on the long run. A simple mechanism of retrospective accountability would involve
empowering a body of future auditors—say, 30 years from now—to decide on the pension
bonus of the decision-makers today based on how successfully these decision-makers promote
the interests of future people. This would provide decision-makers today with a positive
financial incentive to look to the future—at least 30 years from now—when making any
decisions. Such a mechanism would yield a significant advance on the time horizons of present
institutions.
A more sophisticated retrospective accountability mechanism (and the one I favor)
would exploit strategic iteration of this mechanism to extend the time horizons of government
much further again. On the iterated variant, the future auditors who decide on the later
bonuses of present decision-makers themselves face a financial incentive to look again into the
future. For their own financial situation will be tied to the evaluations of the next generation of
auditors, who will determine their pension bonuses. To get a nice retirement bonus, future
auditors have an incentive to evaluate present decision-makers in accordance with the
preferences of the next generation of auditors, and so present decision-makers have an
incentive to satisfy the preferences of the auditors two generations—60 years—from now. And
so iterated, until we have extended the horizons of government to the longest time period
relevant for political decision-making. On the simplest implementation of such accountability
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measures, each assembly decides on the bonus of the assembly 30 years prior.
Because a futures assembly is a soft-power institution, with no formal powers of
censure, a second obstacle it must overcome is ignorance by elected officials. If elected officials
do not seriously consider the advice of the assembly, the latter will have no power whatsoever.
To overcome this barrier, futures assemblies should have two key features. First, they should be
empowered to require reading and response from the legislature, ensuring that their advice is
actually read. Second, they should be designed to be highly public and high-status institutions.
All of their deliberations and reports should be public-facing, with a strong media team and
minimal institutional complexity to ensure that the institution is well-understood by the public.
The assembly should be well-paid and highly informed by experts, and should be constituted by
a demographically stratified random sample of the population. These features together will help
ensure that the assembly has high perceived legitimacy, so that the neglect of the institution by
elected officials will be unpopular among voters.
Tempting though it may be, we should at the given political moment resist giving futures
assemblies any stronger formal powers than this, since the major reason that future-oriented
institutions are repealed is that they have too much formal power (Jones et al 2018). Citizens’
assemblies avoid repeal through their soft-power approach.
A Novel Youth Assembly
Two central considerations favor the adoption of a futures assembly constituted by the
young (i.e., eligible voters under 40, and perhaps younger) rather than by the general populace.
The first and simpler reason is that younger people can generally expect to live longer, allowing
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for much greater time horizons for a retrospective accountability mechanism. The older the
assembly members are, the sooner they will need to receive a bonus for it to be valuable, and
the less valuable to them it will be. The second and more speculative reason is rooted in the
finding that group deliberation creates greater empathy and solidarity between participants
(Grönlund 2017). There is evidence that such social cohesion makes voters more likely to act on
the preferences of the larger group (Berkman and Plutzer 2004). Such social cohesion formed
part of the explanation, in Section II, for the minimal effect of age on short-term policy
preference. If group deliberation succeeds in partly breaking down their cohesion with other
ideological identities and interest groups and causes assembly members to form a more
strongly youth-based political identity, they may in turn be more inclined to support the
(long-term) interests of the young than ordinary voters.
IV. Conclusions
Political short-termism costs the global economy many billions and perhaps trillions of
dollars annually, and leads directly to millions of deaths from disasters and suboptimal resource
allocation. This chapter has considered one popular set of proposals for ameliorating political
short-termism rooted in the plausible thought that younger people will be more motivated to
consider the long term in political decision-making given their longer remaining life expectancy.
It has been shown that this prima facie plausible thought is severely lacking in empirical
support. Younger people are not significantly more motivated to consider the long term in their
voting behavior, and this greatly weakens the case for simple systems of formally empowering
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the young.
However, there are promising signs that alternative mechanisms for empowering the
young would more significantly ameliorate short-termism, such as those incorporating
retrospective liability. I have defended a “Youth Futures Assembly” which incorporates such a
mechanism and can be implemented to significant long-term beneficial effect. Further
experimental evidence about the policy preferences of political surrogates, the incentive effects
of retrospective accountability, and the relationship between group cohesion and policy
preference could significantly strengthen or weaken the case for such a youth assembly, as
could further experimental evidence on the relationship between age and policy preference and
on alternative mechanisms for ameliorating political short-termism. As the discussion in this
chapter has shown, given the high costs of short-termism and the severity with which it plagues
modern institutions, investigation into such matters are vital to the future livelihoods of people
everywhere, from those who are our contemporaries to the myriad heirs of posterity.
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